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CASENOTES
LIABILITY OF COMPUTER MAINTENANCE
PROVIDERS UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW:
STORAGE TECH. CORP. V. CUSTOM HARD WARE
ENG'G & CONSULTING, INC.*
Dean L. Franklint
Timothy D. Kriegertt
INTRODUCTION
Computer hardware and software are key components in many
products we use in our everyday lives. Such products include
automobiles, garage door openers, copy machines, DVD players, and
countless other electronic devices. Inevitably these devices need
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maintenance and repair-tasks that may be performed by either
original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") or independent service
organizations ("ISOs"). Competition for maintenance and repair
work between OEMs and ISOs benefits both individuals and
businesses by lowering costs. The service side of an OEM's business
is often quite lucrative. It is therefore not surprising that some OEMs
have attempted to use the "monopoly power" of the copyright law to
impede competition and secure high profit margins by preventing
ISOs from performing maintenance and repair.
The mere act of powering on a computer causes software code to
automatically load into the computer's random access memory
("RAM"). This code is often copyrighted. In order to perform
maintenance and repair, an ISO obviously must activate the computer.
Because activation makes a copy of the program in RAM, some
enterprising OEMs have claimed that the initial computer startup with
its initial loading of code constitutes copyright infringement. In the
1990's, OEMs had some success restraining ISO competition by
obtaining injunctions. 1 In response, Congress enacted the Computer
Maintenance Competition Assurance Act ("CMCAA"), codified in 17
U.S.C. § 117(c), 2 to protect ISOs by exempting them from copyright
infringement while engaged in maintenance or repair activities.
Until recently the full coverage and scope of the section 117
maintenance exception had been unclear. Two recent opinions
address the scope and coverage of section 117 and construe section
117 as a meaningful exception available not only for one-time repairs
but also for continuing maintenance of the kind often conducted on
major data storage systems. On August 24, 2005, in a victory for
consumers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
in Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engineering &
Consulting, Inc. ("Storage Tech. /'),3 held that 17 U.S.C. § 117
excluded from copyright infringement the copying of computer
programs by an ISO while performing ongoing maintenance on a
computer system.4 In addition, the court further clarified the scope of
the Digital Millenium Copyright Act 5 ("DMCA") and the law of
licensing as applied to copyrights and the DMCA. This decision was
1. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994) (affirming permanent injunction against ISO).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2000).
3. 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied, 431 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
4. Id.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
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followed by a second opinion further explaining the court's reasoning
("Storage Tech. Ir').6
I. COPYRIGHT LAW AND COMPUTER MAINTENANCE
A. BACKGROUND
In Storage Tech. I, Storage Technology Corporation ("STK")
alleged that Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Inc.
("CHE") committed copyright infringement when CHE caused the
copying of STK's copyrighted software while CHE performed
maintenance on customers' data storage systems. 7
1. STK's Robotic Tape Libraries
STK manufactures robotic tape libraries that store computer
data.8 These libraries, some of which are referred to as "silos,"
contain tape cartridges, tape drives, and robotic arms for placing the
tape cartridges in the drives. 9 A separate device known as a Library
Control Unit ("LCU") controls the robotic arms and the actions within
the tape library. 10 A third device called a Library Management Unit
("LMU") manages one or more LCUs.ll In order to retrieve a tape, a
user requests a host computer to send a signal to the LMU, which then
sends a signal to the LCU, which in turn directs the robotic arm to
find the appropriate tape cartridge. 12 The robot retrieves the tape,
places it in a drive and then reports success or failure data to the LCU,
LMU, and the host computer in sequence.13
STK claims its software is comprised of intertwined "functional"
and "maintenance" code. 14 According to STK, the maintenance code
diagnoses malfunctions and aids in tape library maintenance. 15 The
6. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 431 F.3d 1374
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (denying Storage Tech.'s request for rehearing).
7. Storage Tech. I, 421 F.3d at 1067.
8. Id. at 1066.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., No. 02-12102-
RWZ, 2004 WL 1497688, *1-2 (D. Mass. July 2, 2004), vacated, 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
13. Id.
14. Id. at *2.
15. Id.
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"functional" code runs the LCU and the LMU. 16 STK attempts to
protect access to the output from this unitary code through the use of
a password protection system.17 When the tape library is powered on,
all code, whether functional code or maintenance code, is
automatically loaded into the RAM of both the LMU and the LCU.18
Significantly, even though STK claims the maintenance code does not
control the operations of the library system, both the maintenance
code and the functional code must be loaded into RAM for the library
to function. 19
2. CHE's Maintenance Business
CHE is an ISO that competes with STK for maintenance
contracts on STK manufactured tape library systems.20 In order to
repair and maintain the libraries, CHE reboots the library system
thereby making a copy of STK's computer code.2 1 To diagnose
problems with the libraries, CHE uses a hardware device it developed,
known as an Enhanced Library Event Manager ("ELEM") to read
data output from the LCU.22 CHE monitors this data, interprets it,
and uses it to both maintain and repair the equipment. 23 During
CHE's maintenance contract, the ELEM checks the library system to
ensure operation is free from error.24 When CHE's maintenance
contract is over the owner's tape storage library is rebooted, which
destroys the copy that was created when the tape library was powered
on.
25
3. STK's lawsuit against CHE
In October 2002, STK filed suit in the Federal District Court of
Massachusetts claiming that the copying by CHE constituted
copyright infringement under section 106.26 CHE argued that 17
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1067.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1067-68.
22. Id. at 1067. The predecessor to the ELEM was the Library Event Manager ("LEM").
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1067-69.
26. Storage Tech., 2004 WL 1497688, at * 1.
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U.S.C. § 117(c) permitted its copying of the program code. 27 In July
2004, after finding there was a substantial likelihood that STK would
prevail on its claim that CHE committed copyright infringement and
that CHE was not saved by section 117(c), the district court enjoined
CHE from using the ELEM and from making copies of STK's
programs.28
Fourteen months later, the Federal Circuit vacated the district
court's entry of a preliminary injunction against CHE. 29 The court of
appeals found that section 117(c) exempted CHE from copyright
infringement liability when CHE powered on the equipment (thus
causing a copy of STK's program to load from the hard drive to the
RAM) at the beginning of a contract and powered off the equipment
(destroying the RAM copy) at the contract's end several years later.30
The court also determined that STK's license to CHE's customers did
not exclude a customer's right to appoint CHE as its agent to use the
computer programs to perform maintenance.31 Further, CHE did not
violate the DMCA because CHE did not infringe any right of STK
protected by copyright.32
B. DEFENSE TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT UNDER 17
U.S.C. § 117(c)
Section 106 of the Copyright Act 33 grants owners exclusive
rights in their copyrighted works, providing in pertinent part: "[T]he
owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted
work [or] (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work . . .,34
In MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,35 the Ninth Circuit
found that an ISO committed copyright infringement when it created
a copy of a copyrighted computer program while conducting
27. Id. at *3.
28. Id. at *3-6. The district court also found that there was a substantial likelihood that
STK would prevail on its claims that CHE's actions violated the DMCA and constituted trade
secret misappropriation. Id. at *4-5.
29. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1076.
30. Id. at 1071.
31. Id.at1073.
32. Id. at 1074. The Federal Circuit also found that STK's trade secret arguments were
unavailing. Id. at 1076.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
34. Id.
35. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993),cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994).
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maintenance. 36 In that case the ISO turned on the computer in order
to perform maintenance. 37 Powering on the computer caused a copy
of the operating program to be loaded into RAM. 38 In affirming the
district court's grant of a permanent injunction against the ISO, the
court noted: "[I]t is generally accepted that the loading of software
into a computer constitutes the creation of a copy under the Copyright
Act." 39
Congress passed the Computer Maintenance Competition
Assurance Act ("CMCAA"), Title III of the DMCA, as codified in
section 117(c), to address the concern that case law and statutory
interpretation could destroy the computer maintenance and repair
industry.40 Section 117(c) limits the exclusive rights of owners of
copyrights on computer programs under copyright law:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an
infringement for the owner or lessee of a machine to make or
authorize the making of a copy of a computer program if such copy
is made solely by virtue of the activation of a machine that
lawfully contains an authorized copy of the computer program, for
purposes only of maintenance or repair of that machine, if-(1)
such new copy is used in no other manner and is destroyed
immediately after the maintenance or repair is completed; and (2)
with respect to any computer program or part thereof that is not
necessary for that machine to be activated, such program or part
thereof is not accessed or used other than to make such new copy
by virtue of the activation of the machine.4 1
The Massachusetts district court in Storage Tech. found that
CHE's actions did not fall under the protection of section 117(c)
because the copies were not made "for purposes only of maintenance
or repair."'42 The district court concluded that CHE exceeded the
scope of section 1 17's protection by making copies not just for repair
but also for the purpose of circumventing STK's password protection
system in order to access the maintenance code and intercept the
LCU's data output. 43 Further, the district court decided that because
36. Id. at 519.
37. Id. at 518.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 519.
40. Telecomm Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Commc'ns., Inc., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1793, 1795-96 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (emphasis added).
42. Storage Tech., 2004 WL 1497688, at *3 (emphasis added).
43. Id.
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CHE did not reboot the library system after each repair, and instead
used the ELEM to continuously maintain and monitor the system and
make repairs over the length of the contract, CHE failed to destroy the
copy "immediately after the maintenance or repair." '44
On appeal CHE argued that its actions were protected under
section 117(c). 45 STK's counter was that (1) CHE did not destroy the
copy of the computer program after its maintenance was completed;
(2) the maintenance code was not "necessary for the machine to be
activated" so that CHE could not access it without failing section
117(c)(2); and, (3) CHE did not make a copy of the computer
program "for purpose only of maintenance or repair."'46
1. Destruction of the copy after maintenance completed as
required under section 1 17(c).
As noted above, section 117(c) requires that if a copy of a
program is made while maintaining a computer, then the copy must
be destroyed immediately after the maintenance is complete.47 The
Federal Circuit found that the district court erred because it focused
only on whether CHE's repairs satisfied the statute and failed to
address CHE's maintenance.48  The issue was whether CHE's
monitoring during its contract was "maintenance" under the statute
such that destroying the copies after completion of the contract would
satisfy section I17's destruction requirement. This required a
determination of what constitutes "maintenance or repair" as used in
the statute.
In order to determine if CHE's activities fell under "maintenance
or repair," the Federal Circuit looked to section 117 and its legislative
history. Section 117(d) defines maintenance as "the servicing of the
machine in order to make it work in accordance with its original
specification and any changes to those specifications for that
machine."' 49 Repair is defined as "the restoring of the machine to the
state of working in accordance with its original specifications and any
changes to those specifications authorized for that machine."'50 The
Federal Circuit reasoned that by defining the terms separately and
44. Id.
45. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1068.
46. Id.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2000).
48. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1069.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 117(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
50. Id. (emphasis added).
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distinctly Congress must have intended these two terms to encompass
two distinct activities. 51
Having determined that "maintenance" and "repair" were
separate concepts, the Federal Circuit then examined the activities
that would fall under each term. The court found guidance in the
Senate and House reports. According to the Senate Report,
"maintenance" includes "cleaning the machine, tightening
connections, installing new components such as memory chips, circuit
boards and hard disks, checking the proper functioning of these
components, and other similar acts."'52 In contrast, "repair" is defined
as "replacing worn or defective components such as memory chips,
circuit boards and hard disks, correcting the improper installation of
new components and other similar acts."'53 The court focused on the
language "checking the proper functioning of [the] components," and
found that maintenance has "a much broader temporal connotation"
such that it is not limited to "fixing a single isolated malfunction" as
in the definition of "repair," but includes monitoring computer
systems for problems. 54
The Federal Circuit further reasoned that interpreting
"maintenance" to include monitoring a computer system over a period
of time coincides with the purpose behind section 117 stated in the
House Report. 55 Section 117 was enacted "to ensure that independent
service organizations do not inadvertently become liable for copyright
infringement merely because they have turned on a machine in order
to service its hardware components. ' 56 The House Report also notes
that section 117 was "narrowly crafted" to allow making the copy
while performing maintenance, but not to allow a party to claim the
protection of section 117 and then use the copy for purposes that
exceed maintenance. 57  The Federal Circuit concluded that the
51. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1069.
52. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 58 (1998).
53. Id.
54. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1069.
55. Id.
56. H.R. REP. No. 105-55 1, pt. 1, at 27(1998).
57. Id. The House Report provides:
The legislation is narrowly crafted to achieve the foregoing objective without
prejudicing the rights of copyright owners of computer software. Thus, for
example, the amendment does not relieve from liability persons who make
unauthorized adaptations, modifications or other changes to the software. The
amendment also does not relieve from liability persons who make any
unauthorized copies of software other than those caused solely by activation of
the machine.
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purpose of section 117 would not be furthered by limiting
maintenance to "fixing a single isolated malfunction. '58 Rather,
"maintenance" could include monitoring over a period of time while
still fulfilling the purpose of preventing illicit copying. 59
The Federal Circuit then examined CHE's activities. It found
CHE's uses of its ELEM tool to monitor and fix tape library
malfunctions on an ongoing basis while the system operated did not
fit under the definition of "repair" because the ELEM devices
continued to operate after the system was restored to a "state of
working in accordance with its original specifications. '60
Nevertheless, the court found the ELEM was covered by section
117's definition of "maintenance" because CHE "check[ed] the
proper functioning" of the libraries and made sure the system
"work[ed] in accordance with its original specifications."' 61
Therefore, even though CHE's monitoring occurred over an extended
period of time, because CHE's activities fell under the definition of
"maintenance," CHE satisfied the requirement of destroying the copy
"immediately after the maintenance or repair is completed" when it
turned the machine off at the end of a maintenance contract. 62
2. Prohibition of access to maintenance code that is not
necessary for computer activation under
section 117(c).
Section 117(c)(2) prohibits any use of copyrighted computer
programs that are "not necessary for [the] machine to be activated. ' 63
In order to diagnose tape library errors and prevent errors from
occurring, CHE used the ELEM to send a signal to the LCU that
caused the LCU to transmit data.64 This data was then collected and
interpreted by CHE to enable it to fix errors or prevent them from
occurring. 65 STK claimed that CHE's use of the LCU code to
transmit data violated the provisions of section 117(c) because CHE
was using a program that was "not necessary for [the] machine to be
Id.
58. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1069.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 17(c)(2) (2000).
64. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1067.
65. Id.
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activated." 66
In order to determine whether the code was "necessary for [the]
machine to be activated," the Federal Circuit first noted that this
phrase cannot mean "any" code that resides in a computer's RAM
after startup is "necessary for activation." Otherwise, every program
would be accessible and the requirement would essentially be read out
of the statute. 67 On the other hand, construing the phrase so narrowly
as to exclude programs that, for example, allow the computer monitor
to function, would conflict with the purpose of section 117 because
ISOs would be hindered in performing their service by not having the
use of the monitor.68 The Federal Circuit again found guidance in the
House Report.69
The House Report states the OEM or owner of a computer can
configure the computer to load programs into RAM that may not be
necessary to the activation of the computer.70 Examples of such
programs are diagnostic and utility programs or application programs
which are separate and distinct from the operating system. 71
Although these "freestanding programs" may be copied into RAM
upon startup, section 117 does not permit such programs to be used
by the ISO.72
The Federal Circuit also looked to the definitions of repair and
maintenance in section 117(d). 73 Both definitions contain language
indicating that repair and maintenance include keeping the system
working "in accordance with its original specifications and any
changes to those specifications authorized for that machine. '74 Such
language necessarily required that the ISO be able to activate the
computer to make sure it "work[ed] in accordance with its original
specifications. ' 75 At the same time, the court cautioned that this
language provides no protection to ISO's who use "freestanding
programs" because such use would not be necessary for verifying
66. Id. at 1070.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. H.R. REP. No. 105-55 1, pt. 1, at 28(1998).
71. Id.
72. Id. (stating "[iln order to avoid inadvertent copyright infringement, these programs
need to be covered by subsection (c), but only to the extent that they are automatically
reproduced when the machine is turned on.").
73. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1070.
74. 17 U.S.C. § I17(d) (2000).
75. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1070.
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whether the machine was working "in accordance with its original
specifications. '76
The Federal Circuit rejected STK's argument that its
maintenance code was a "freestanding" diagnostic or utility program
not exempt under section 117(c)(2). The court found that STK had
designed its maintenance code as a unitary code, inseparably
intertwined with the functional code. 77 Accordingly, the maintenance
code was "necessary for that machine to be activated" because it was
"so entangled with the functional code that the entire code must be
loaded into RAM for the machine to function at all."'78 Because
section 117(c)(2) only restricts access to programs "not necessary for
that machine to be activated," CHE's use of the maintenance code
was exempt from copyright infringement under section 117(c). 79
3. CHE copied for the purpose of maintenance and repair
as required under section 117(c).
Section 117(c) also requires that when a copy of a program is
made, it must be "for purposes only of maintenance or repair of that
machine." 80 STK argued that CHE's copying of the program was not
for the purpose of maintenance and repair, but to gain access to the
maintenance code. 81 The Federal Circuit likened this to arguing that
an ISO should not be allowed to activate the computer keyboard to
service the computer because the purpose of activating a keyboard
would be to allow the ISO to type.82 In rejecting this argument, the
court reasoned that if such logic was accepted, section 117(c) would
provide no protection for ISOs. 83
C. LICENSE A GREEMENTS AND COPYRIGHTS
1. Background
Generally, OEMs sell the hardware whereas use of the associated
76. id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. It did not matter that STK theoretically could have configured a system where the
maintenance code was separate from the functional code. Id. Here, STK had not configured the
library system to start up without loading both the maintenance and functional code, so what it
might have done was beside the point. Id.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2000).
81. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1071.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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software is authorized by granting a license. 84 That is the model
followed by STK. It sells a library system and licenses the programs
that operate the system.85 In this case, STK's licenses purported to
cover the functional code and exclude the maintenance code.86 The
district court rejected CHE's argument that the licenses provided to its
STK library owners allowed them to copy STK's programs because
the licenses "simply and explicitly do not encompass the Maintenance
Code."'87 On appeal, CHE argued that because the licenses allowed
customers to activate their machines, this created an implicit license
for CHE, as the customer's agent, to copy the maintenance code.88
2. Copying of the Maintenance Code is Authorized by the
License
Even though STK claimed its license agreements explicitly
excluded maintenance code, the Federal Circuit found the license
implicitly allowed the copying of the maintenance code.89 The
licenses allowed customers to use STK's code "for the sole purpose
of enabling the specific unit of Equipment for which the Internal
Code was provided to perform its data storage and retrieval or other
operating function." 90 The court reasoned that the licenses authorized
and exempted from copyright infringement customers who activated
the LCU and LMU.91 The Federal Circuit then found that CHE was
the customer's agent and, therefore, CHE did not commit copyright
infringement by activating the LCU and LMU.92 Because the license
agreement permitted the activation of the equipment, and both the
maintenance code and functional code must be copied in order to
activate the equipment, the Federal Circuit concluded that the license
necessarily allows the copying of the maintenance code.93
84. See MA1 Sys., 991 F.2d at 517 (manufacturer of computers and designer of software
issued licenses to customers for using software on their computers); DSC Commc'ns Corp. v.
DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 599 (5th Cir. 1996) (manufacturer of a phone switch system
issued software licenses to its customers).
85. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1067.
86. Id.
87. Storage Tech., 2004 WL 1497688, at *3.
88. Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1071.
89. Id. See also Storage Tech. 11, 431 F.3d at 1377.
90. Storage Tech. !, 421 F.3d at 1071 (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
2006] STORAGE TECH. v. CUSTOM HARDWARE 831
3. Use of the Maintenance Code Does not Violate
Copyright Law
STK argued CHE committed copyright infringement by using
the maintenance code, which STK claimed was explicitly precluded
by the license.94 In a copyright action involving a license, the
copying must be outside the scope of the license and "the source of
the copyright owner's complaint must be grounded in a right
protected by the Copyright Act, such as unlawful reproduction or
distribution." 95  The Federal Circuit concluded that these
requirements for infringement were not satisfied.96 As discussed
above, the copying of the maintenance code was within the scope of
the license, which precluded an infringement claim with regard to
copying by CHE. 97 STK argued that use of the maintenance code
was beyond the scope of the license. 98 The Federal Circuit found this
argument irrelevant because use of a copyrighted work is not
prohibited by the Copyright Act and therefore would not constitute
grounds for copyright infringement.99
4. Third Parties are Authorized by the License
STK argued that third parties were restricted from copying
STK's program into RAM because its license agreement stated that
the library owner could not "sublicense, assign, lease or permit
another person to use the Internal Code (except as provided...
below)." 100 The Federal Circuit responded to this reasoning by noting
that other language in the license stated that library owners "may
transfer possession of the Internal Code only with the transfer of the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Storage Tech. I, 421 F.3d at 1072.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The court used the following example to illustrate its point:
[C]onsider a license in which the copyright owner grants a person the right to
make one and only one copy of a book with the caveat that the licensee may not
read the last ten pages. Obviously, a licensee who made a hundred copies of the
book would be liable for copyright infringement because the copying would
violate the Copyright Act's prohibition on reproduction and would exceed the
scope of the license. Alternatively, if the licensee made a single copy of the
book, but read the last ten pages, the only cause of action would be for breach of
contract, because reading a work does not violate any right protected by
copyright law.
Id.
100. Id.
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Equipment on which its use is authorized," which indicated that the
license to copy is tied to the equipment and not the user.101 Further
bolstering the interpretation that the licenses granted third party use
was a version of the license that excluded OEM-provided
maintenance if such maintenance was required due to "misuse of the
Equipment or negligence by the customer or a third party."'102 The
Federal Circuit concluded that these clauses did not prohibit third
party copying - they simply indicated that the license prohibited
providing someone with a copy of the program without transferring
the library system to them as well. 103 Because the license in this case
did not explicitly prohibit third parties from powering up the
machines, CHE's copying was within the scope of the license.
II. DIGITAL MILLENIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
Congress enacted the DMCA to make it illegal to decode
encryption methods protecting copyrighted works that are available in
a digital format. 104 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) states in pertinent part: "No
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title."'105
Prior to Storage Tech. I, the seminal Federal Circuit case
construing the DMCA was the 2004 decision in Chamberlain Group,
Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc. 106 Chamberlain manufactured garage door
opener systems. 10 7 During operation, the user activated a transmitter
which sent a radio frequency signal to a receiver.10 8 The receiver
processed the signal and directed the motor to open or close the
garage door. 109 To prevent other devices from opening the garage
door, the receiver contained a copyrighted program that constantly
changed the signal required to open the door. 10 The transmitter had a
computer program that changed its signal to match the signal required
by the receiver. 111 Skylink manufactured replacement garage door
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. H.R.REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 10 (1998).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
106. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (case of first impression interpreting § 1201(a)(2) of
the DMCA).
107. Id. at 1183.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1183-84.
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opener transmitters designed to send signals that cause the software
on Chamberlain's receiver to open the garage door. 112 Chamberlain
sued Skylink for violation of the DMCA, alleging Skylink
circumvented its security measures in order to allow customers to
access the receiver's software to open the garage door. 113
The Federal Circuit rejected Chamberlain's DMCA claim on two
grounds: (1) the access to its software was implicitly authorized, and
(2) there was no copyright infringement or facilitating of copyright
infringement.l14 The court explained that "access" under section
1201(a) must "bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that
the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners."'1 15 Further, a
violation of section 1201 requires proof of five elements: "(1)
ownership of a valid copyright in a work; (2) effectively controlled by
a technological measure, which has been circumvented; (3) that third
parties can now access; (4) without authorization, in a manner that (5)
infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected by the Copyright
Act."1 16 The fifth element is also referred to as the "nexus between
access and protection." 1 7 The Federal Circuit focused on the fact
that Chamberlain did not restrict the customer's use of the software
through a license, indicating access to the software was implicitly
authorized. 118 The court also found that there was no copyright
infringement when the defendant accessed the software to open the
garage door. 19 The Copyright Act prohibits the public from copying
a work but does not prevent mere access. 120 Therefore, there was no
"nexus" between the access and copyright protection necessary for a
DMCA violation. 121
The Federal Circuit left open the questions of the effects of
licenses on liability when a technological measure is circumvented in
order to gain access to software when that access is permissible under
the Copyright Act.122 These questions were answered in Storage
112. Id. at 1184-85.
113. Chamberlain Group, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1181-86.
114. ld. at 1204.
115. Id. at 1203.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1204.
118. Chamberlain Group, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1187, 1204.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1202 n.17.
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Tech. L123 There, the Federal Circuit indicated that, regardless of
whether the license may restrict use of the software, the use must
violate a right protected by the copyright laws, as opposed to a right
protected only by license, in order to sustain a DMCA claim. 124
In the other landmark case that preceded Storage Tech. I,
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the Sixth
Circuit addressed the meaning of "access" when determining whether
a technological measure "effectively controls access" under the
DMCA. 125 Lexmark is an OEM of printer and toner cartridges. 126
Each toner cartridge contained a Toner Loading Program that
calculated the toner level. 127 Each printer contained a Printer Engine
Program that controlled printer functions. 128 Lexmark attempted to
prevent consumers from using refurbished toner cartridges through an
authentication sequence that employed an encryption algorithm
present on each printer and toner cartridge.' 2 9  During the
authentication sequence, the encryption algorithm on each device
generated a code. If the code generated by the printer matched the
code generated by the toner cartridge, the printer functioned
properly.130 After the authentication sequence was complete, a copy
of the Toner Loading Program was downloaded from the toner
cartridge onto the printer in order to measure the toner levels. 131
Static Control Components, Inc., ("SCC") manufactured microchips
that contained an exact copy of Lexmark's Toner Loading Program
and satisfied the authentication sequence, allowing refurbished toner
cartridges to work with Lexmark's printers. 132 Alleging copyright
and DMCA violations, Lexmark brought suit to enjoin SCC from
selling these microchips to cartridge remanufacturers. 133
The Sixth Circuit found the DMCA did not apply because
Lexmark's "technological measure," the authentication sequence, did
not effectively control "access" to Lexmark's Printer Engine Program
123. 421 F.3d at 1067.
124. Id. at 1074.
125. 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
126. Id. at 529.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 530.
130. Id.
131. 387 F.3d at 531.
132. Id. at 530.
133. Id. at 531.
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and Toner Loading Program. 134 With respect to the Printer Engine
Program, the authentication sequence attempted to prevent the use of
the printer, and therefore also the use of the Printer Engine Program,
unless authorized Lexmark toner cartridges were used. 135 The Sixth
Circuit found that the meaning of "access" as used in the DMCA was
not limited to using the printer, but also included reading or copying
the literal code. 136  Without circumvention of the authentication
sequence, anyone who bought the printer could read the literal code of
the Printer Engine Program directly from the printer memory and
create copies. 137 Because no circumvention was required to read or
copy the Printer Engine Program, Lexmark did not have a
"technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under [the copyright statute]."'1 38 For the same reasons, the
DMCA did not apply to the copy of the Toner Loading Program that
was downloaded onto the printer after authentication. 139
Similar to both Chamberlain and Lexmark, STK's security
measures did not prevent copying of code. Instead of focusing on
circumvention and the effectiveness of the technological measure in
controlling access to the code, as in Lexmark, the Federal Circuit in
Storage Tech. I followed Chamberlain and looked to whether CHE
circumvented STK's security measures in a manner that "infringes or
facilitates infringing a right protected by the Copyright Act.' 140
STK employed a password protection scheme called GetKey in
an attempt to protect its allegedly copyrighted maintenance code. 141
GetKey was a program independent from the library system software
and was kept at STK's headquarters. 142 Under normal operation
while performing maintenance, STK's technicians would call STK's
headquarters, provide the equipment serial number, and GetKey
would provide them with a password allowing the technician to
134. Id. at 547-50.
135. Id. at 530. Lexmark offered a discount to consumers who purchased cartridges and
agreed under a shrink-wrap license to return the cartridge after one use. Id. The authentication
sequence was designed to ensure consumers adhered to this agreement. Id.
136. 387 F.3d at 547.
137. Id. at 546.
138. Id. at 549 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B)).
139. Id. at 550. The court also disposed of the claim with respect to the Toner Loading
Program on the SCC chip because "the SCC chip does not provide 'access' to the Toner
Loading Program but replaces the program." Id.
140. See Storage Tech. 1, 421 F.3d at 1073 (quoting Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
141. Storage Tech., 2004 WL 1497688, at *2.
142. Id.
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access the maintenance code.143 The technician used the maintenance
code to cause the library system to transmit data for diagnosing the
malfunction. 144
STK alleged that CHE circumvented GetKey by using the
ELEM (and previously a device known as the "LEM") in order to
gain access to the maintenance code. 145 The ELEM replicated the
signals that would be sent from the LMU to the LCU to order
transmission of data.146 The code would then transmit data that CHE
would interpret to diagnose malfunctions or determine that
preventative maintenance steps were in order. 147
The district court found that CHE violated the DMCA by using
the ELEM to circumvent GetKey and cause the LCU to transmit
data. 148 The Federal Circuit disagreed. Following its precedent in
Chamberlain, the Federal Circuit stated: "To the extent that CHE's
activities do not constitute copyright infringement or facilitate
copyright infringement, StorageTek is foreclosed from maintaining an
action under the DMCA."'1 49 As discussed in section II above, the
court had already found that CHE's rebooting of the LCU and LMU
(thereby creating a copy of the code) did not constitute copyright
infringement. Therefore, STK had to show that CHE's circumvention
using the ELEM facilitated copyright infringement. 150
The Federal Circuit found that CHE's use of the ELEM to
circumvent GetKey did not facilitate copyright infringement because
there was "no nexus between any possible infringement and the use of
the circumvention devices." 151  First, use of the ELEM was
independent of the copying of the program into RAM when the LMU
or LCU was rebooted.152 In other words, there was no nexus because
the possible infringement (when the copy was made) occurs whether
the ELEM device is used or not.153 Second, while CHE used the
ELEM to circumvent GetKey in order to transmit data, mere data
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Storage Tech. !, 421 F.3d at 1067.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Storage Tech., 2004 WL 1497688, at *4.
149. Storage Tech. !, 421 F.3d at 1074 (emphasis added).
150. Id. ("Even if StorageTek were able to prove that the automatic copying of the software
into RAM constituted copyright infringement, it would still have to show that the LEM or
ELEM facilitated that infringement.").
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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transmission would not constitute infringement, therefore precluding
the finding of a nexus here as well.154
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DENIAL OF REHEARING
After the Federal Circuit vacated the district court's grant of a
preliminary injunction, STK filed a Petition for Rehearing or
Rehearing En Banc.155 This petition was denied in Storage Tech.
1.156 In Storage Tech. II, the Federal Circuit enunciated four
requirements to establish the maintenance defense under section
117(c) and further explained the basis of its original holding. 157 The
court stated that section 117(c) exempts an ISO from copyright
infringement when it copies a computer program if four requirements
are satisfied:
(1) the copy is made "solely by virtue of the activation of a
machine" that contains an authorized copy of the program,
(2) if the copy is made "for the purposes only of maintenance or
repair of the machine,"
(3) if the new copy is not used in any other manner and is
destroyed immediately after the maintenance or repair is
completed, and
(4) with respect to any computer program or part of the program
that is not "necessary for [the] machine to be activated," the
program "is not accessed or used other than to make a new copy by
virtue of the activation of the machine."1 58
CHE was not precluded from invoking the protection of section
117(c) by the statutory language excepting from protection
unauthorized access of programs that are "not necessary for [the]
machine to be activated" or by the respective legislative history. 159
The court reiterated that in this particular case, because the
"maintenance code was so entangled with the functional code," the
maintenance code was "necessary" according to the statutory
language. 160 STK argued in its petition that the legislative history,
specifically the Senate Report, indicated that section 117(c) did not
154. Id.
155. Storage Tech. 11, 431 F.3dat 1375.
156. Id. at 1377.
157. Id. at 1375-77.
158. Id. at 1375.
159. Id. at 1376.
160. Id.
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protect unauthorized access of "diagnostic and utility programs that
load into RAM with or as part of the operating system."'161 STK
contended that its maintenance code fit the above description of a
"diagnostic" program so that unauthorized access of the maintenance
code was not protected by section 117.162 The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument, pointing out that STK ignored the surrounding
text, which states that section 117(c) was not intended to affect the
OEM's rights regarding programs that "may be loaded into RAM
when the computer is turned on, but which did not need to be so
loaded in order for the machine to be turned on." 163  Because
activation of the library system required the maintenance code to be
loaded into RAM, the portion of the legislative history excluding
from protection diagnostic programs from protection did not apply to
STK's maintenance code. 164
Additionally, the court's conclusion that the license permitted
CHE to copy the maintenance code was based on the court's finding
that permission to copy was implicit in the license. 165 The court
reiterated the holding in its original opinion, stating: "[T]he license
provisions must be interpreted to allow the licensees to activate their
equipment, and because StorageTek made it impossible to activate
that equipment without copying the maintenance code, the license
necessarily authorizes the copying of that code."'1 66
161. Id. The report provides:
[A]s is made clear in paragraph (c)(2), the amendment is not intended to diminish
the rights of copyright owners of those computer programs, or parts thereof, that
also may be loaded into RAM when the computer is turned on, but which did not
need to be so loaded in order for the machine to be turned on. A hardware
manufacturer or software developer might, for example, provide diagnostic and
utility programs that load into RAM along with or as part of the operating
system, even though they market those programs as separate products-either as
freestanding programs, or pursuant to separate licensing agreements. Indeed, a
password or other technical access device is sometimes required for the owner of
the machine to be able to gain access to such programs.... This subsection is not
intended to legitimize unauthorized access to and use of such programs just
because they happen to be resident in the machine itself and are reproduced with
or as part of the operating system when the machine is turned on.
S. REP. No. 105-190, at 57-58 (1998).
162. Storage Tech. H, 431 F.3d at 1376.
163. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 57 (emphasis added)).
164. Storage Tech. 11, 431 F.3d at 1376.
165. Id. at 1377.
166. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit decisions in Storage Tech. I and II are a
victory for consumers. They apply the protection of 17 U.S.C. §
117(c) not only to ISOs that perform discrete repairs, but also to ISOs
that provide a continuous service over the length of a contract. Also,
when computers are configured by OEMs to load copies of any
program into RAM upon startup, section 117 will preclude copyright
infringement or contributory copyright infringement claims against
ISOs that later start up the computers in order to perform
maintenance. None of this affects the protection of the OEM's works
against copying for purposes other than computer maintenance.
These decisions thus permit and encourage competition for
maintenance-a gain for consumers-while not diminishing the
substantive copyright protection of OEM software.
By striking the appropriate balance between the interests of the
public and the interest of protecting copyrighted works, these
decisions undercut the ability of manufacturers to use the DMCA as a
tool to create or maintain monopolies in computer maintenance.
Following the precedent set forth in Chamberlain that required an
underlying copyright infringement or facilitation of copyright
infringement, the Federal Circuit's decision in Storage Tech. I assures
that the DMCA cannot be used to create a separate property right. In
addition, these decisions prevent the manufacturer from placing
restrictive terms in its licenses and then suing a maintenance provider
under the DMCA for a violation of the license that would not be a
violation of copyright law.
In conclusion, these Federal Circuit decisions are ground-
breaking opinions that explain for the first time the maintenance
exception under the Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance
Act. With respect to the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, the
Storage Tech. I decision is a continuation of the precedent set forth by
the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain that, while the DMCA creates
new potential grounds for liability, it does not create a new property
right.
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